Has the negotiation process related to the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war really been revived? Could the brief peace in Oleshky set a precedent for new humanitarian operations? And can the Russian, Ukrainian, and American delegations agree on anything if they, of course, meet in Abu Dhabi?

If we place the events of the past weeks in chronological order, we can see a masterfully crafted Russian special operation aimed at proving the effectiveness of U.S. President Donald Trump's peacekeeping efforts ahead of the midterm elections to the American Congress.

So, October 9. The Ukrainian delegation in Washington holds negotiations with American intermediaries in the presence of Europeans. And then it becomes known about a phone conversation between Trump and Putin, during which the presidents agree on the supply of Russian diesel to the States and a temporary suspension of sanctions against Russian oil. Volodymyr Zelensky calls this "investments in war," reports emerge about problems with the provision of intelligence information and the speed of "Starlinks." The U.S. President announces an "energy truce," which neither Kyiv nor Moscow knows about. However, the diplomatic process continues. On October 19, the leaders of Ukraine, Norway, and Finland meet with Steve Witkoff in Oslo to work on joint proposals, which the American intermediary presents to the Russian president on October 21 during hours-long negotiations in St. Petersburg. As a result of this meeting, they agree to hold consultations between the Russian, Ukrainian, and American delegations. Assistant to the Russian President Yuri Ushakov clarifies that such negotiations may take place after November 4 — that is, after the American elections.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin proposes holding a meeting of the leaders of the U.S., China, and Russia at the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November to negotiate the war without Ukraine's participation. Trump confirmed his readiness for such a meeting with Putin and Xi Jinping but said it could concern global security and denuclearization issues. On October 25, Ushakov confirms that preparations for such a meeting have already begun. And on October 27, Finnish President Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Støre — participants in the Oslo negotiations — call Putin.

On October 23, the White House website reported that through Melania Trump's mediation, a ceasefire would be established in the long-suffering Oleshky in the Kherson region, and President Trump emphasized that his wife handled it better than professional diplomats. On October 27, the local truce took effect, allowing for the evacuation of some people and the provision of humanitarian aid to those who remain. Simultaneously, media reports express concerns that the Russians might use the truce to advance on Kherson.

On October 28, Yuri Ushakov emphasized that there is no specific date for the meeting of the delegations, and its very conduct will depend on the situation on the battlefield. The next day, the assistant to the Russian president stressed that if there are "massive bombings" or drone attacks from Ukraine, it will drastically affect Moscow's mood, and the meeting will be in question. Meanwhile, Russia continued to attack Ukraine.

On November 1, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who met with the head of China in Beijing, noted with some surprise that Xi Jinping was unaware of the preparations for a meeting of the three leaders to discuss the Ukrainian issue. The head of China, with feigned naivety, asked his interlocutor where such rumors come from. The potential meeting of Trump, Putin, and Xi in Shenzhen on November 18–19 is still possible, but the Ukraine issue will not be discussed there. The head of China told the German president that the war in Ukraine is a European conflict, so Europeans should be at the negotiating table, which completely contradicts Ushakov's statements.

Thus, we can say that we are facing a negotiation facade built by the Kremlin not without the White House's participation to demonstrate diplomatic efforts ahead of the elections. The fact that this is a facade is indicated by such moments as the lack of any specifics regarding new proposals for negotiations and the Kremlin's unwillingness to set dates before the U.S. midterm elections. The truce, which Trump has been trying to insist on since the first days after his return to the Oval Office, is replaced by a short-term ceasefire on a limited part of the front for a humanitarian operation. And even before the midterm elections, Moscow begins to abandon the very idea of resuming the negotiation process. I won't even mention the bluff with the "summit of three," where they allegedly planned to divide the world.

Thus, a significant achievement would be at least an attempt to revive the negotiation process after the midterm elections — although there are few chances for this, and no chances that such a process will lead to any real agreements, as the Kremlin does not intend to stop strikes on Ukraine and seems to believe that destroying infrastructure will prompt Kyiv to unconditional surrender. And although Trump continues to make vague optimistic statements, his Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted that there is no hope for the success of the negotiation process and that Putin is unlikely to be satisfied with just Donbas.

And this frank statement by the American Secretary of State is an acknowledgment of the real, not the imitative realities of Operation "Oslo."