Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote a letter to Donald Trump. After another Russian strike on Kyiv—again targeting markets, shopping centers, and residential areas—the President of Ukraine reached out to his American counterpart with a request to help strengthen air defense.

So far, the response has come only indirectly—from U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. Its essence boils down to a simple promise: we will help as much as we can. However, it seems the capabilities are currently limited. Following the Middle Eastern crisis, American missile stocks are depleted, and time is needed to replenish them.

This logic can be understood. Theoretically.

But the people in Kyiv cannot wait for the Pentagon to restock. They are living—or not surviving—under Russian attacks right now. And we fully understand that Putin is not going to stop these attacks. Air terror has become one of his main tools in this war. Moreover, the Russian president is trying to turn the territorial war into a demographic one. He continues to hope that with each strike, Ukraine's population will decrease, and large Ukrainian cities will cease to seem safe even for those who have not yet left their homes.

 And here arises a question, the answer to which is not very comfortable.

 How has it happened that the most powerful army in the world, after several months of a limited conflict in the Middle East, can no longer provide an ally with a sufficient number of air defense systems? If one theater of operations exhausts resources so much, what will happen in the case of multiple simultaneous crises? And what will remain of the perceptions of American military might then?

But fine. Let's assume so.

What should Ukraine do then?

There is an answer, and it is not new. I just have to repeat it over and over again.

Firstly, Europe. IRIS-T, SAMP/T, European-made Patriot—all of these exist. The problem is not that these systems do not exist. The problem is whether European countries are ready to transfer them to Ukraine quickly and in sufficient quantities. Sometimes such readiness exists. More often, it has to be fought for after each new strike on Ukrainian cities.

Secondly, domestic production. Ukraine is already creating drones and missiles under wartime conditions. This will not replace the Patriot, but it is a reality that needs to be scaled. For this, technologies, components, investments, and production cooperation with allies are needed. Not just words of support.

 And finally—the most important.

The best defense for Ukrainian cities is the destruction of Russian capabilities to strike. Factories, warehouses, logistical hubs, launchers. Ukraine has been asking its partners for such capabilities for years. And this is exactly what many in the West still fear—due to considerations that, after each new strike on Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, or Dnipro, seem less and less convincing.

 The paradox of this war is simple and harsh. The West provides Ukraine with a shield—and not always in sufficient quantity—but at the same time often limits the ability to strike back at the attacker. And then wonders why these attacks do not stop.

 Zelenskyy's letter was entirely logical. Hegseth's response was predictable. But letters and responses are a conversation, not a strategy.

Strategy begins where, after the next attempt to strike Kyiv, there is the ability to thwart it.

 And preferably—before the missiles fly again towards Ukrainian cities.