The visit of Donald Trump to the Chinese capital and his negotiations with the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, have once again raised the question of how interested Beijing is in ending the Russian-Ukrainian war and whether it is willing to influence the position of Russian President Putin. Especially since Putin is heading to China following Trump and will hold talks with the Chinese leader literally a few days after the American president leaves Beijing.

It is known from both U.S. and Chinese representatives that the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian war was discussed by the American and Chinese leaders. After Trump's visit, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that China is interested in the war ending and in the activation of peace efforts.

The question is how Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Kyiv envision the end of this war and the negotiations themselves. From a common-sense perspective, it would be logical for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to take place after a ceasefire in hostilities is achieved. This has always been Ukraine's position, while Russia has always opposed it. President Trump, at the beginning of his presidency, also advocated for negotiations after a ceasefire, but later retreated from his position and agreed with Putin's concept of negotiations during the war—a concept that has so far led to no real results other than the deliberate stalling by the Russian president. However, we have yet to hear China's stance on a real model of negotiations.

Regarding the outcomes of the war, positions also differ. Ukraine seeks to maintain its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right to determine its own future. In this, it is supported by the collective West. The United States is willing to agree to a ceasefire along the line of contact and not restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity by military means, but at the same time advocates for the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty. Moscow, clearly, has different goals. Putin is willing to fight until the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and may only stop when he lacks the resources to achieve this goal.

And what about China? Of course, Beijing has no particular interest in Ukraine disappearing from the political map of the world, but at the same time, it is not interested in Ukraine remaining a state that becomes part of the West. Beijing would be satisfied with two options—either the annexation of former Ukrainian territories to Russia or the preservation of Ukraine as an independent state, but within the orbit of Russian influence and under significant Chinese oversight. A model of such statehood already exists next to Ukraine—Lukashenko's Belarus. The Belarusian dictator relies on Russian bayonets but constantly looks to Beijing, realizing that it is the Chinese leader who guarantees that Putin will not one day simply annex Belarus to Russia as provinces.

So what could Trump discuss with Xi when it comes to ending the war? In reality—practically nothing, as with most other issues on the U.S.-China agenda. But the American president could influence the Chinese leadership regarding the obvious assistance China provides to Russia for its resilience in the war and overcoming the consequences of Western sanctions. The less Chinese assistance there is, the sooner the war will end. But does the President of the United States have the opportunity to discuss this with the head of the PRC today, when his own administration allows Russia to profit from oil amid the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz? If you are effectively weakening sanctions against Russia yourself—how can you demand someone else to increase pressure?

And here we come back to a simple and obvious truth. The issue is not China's position. The issue is America's capabilities.