The second half of January in Ukraine was marked by the return of NABU to the center of political attention. The high-profile suspicions against Yulia Tymoshenko for attempting to bribe deputies and the accusations against former Head of the State Border Service Serhiy Deineko for facilitating smuggling demonstrated that the anti-corruption machine was back in operation. However, the main question is not the loudness of the cases, but their political timing and, accordingly, the versions regarding the motives of the top "fighters against corruption."

NABU has never been exclusively a Ukrainian project. It was created with active financial support and guidance from the West, primarily the USA. Therefore, the version of maintaining American influence appears not as a conspiracy theory, but as a rational hypothesis. Especially considering that for several years, the bureau was essentially dormant, consuming a huge budget and avoiding strikes on the real centers of power.

The situation changed dramatically after Donald Trump returned to the White House. The activation of NABU strangely coincided with pressure on Kyiv to enter the negotiation process for "peace" or "truce" with Russia (which is one of Trump's pre-election promises). The case of businessman and simultaneously presidential friend Mindich seemed not only anti-corruption but also geopolitical — as a signal to Zelensky about the undesirability of delaying negotiations. And the signal was swiftly heard — negotiations in Istanbul started rapidly.

However, the initial shock for Bankova quickly passed. The heads of NABU and SAP calmly came for a personal meeting with the President immediately after the "Cardboard Maidan," demonstrating readiness for direct dialogue. It became clear: for the authorities, the important thing is not a war with the anti-corruption vertical to destruction, but control over this vertical, even if it is unofficial and behind the scenes. Since then, NABU's activities increasingly resemble balancing on the principle of "both ours and yours."

New cases exist. Formally, they touch the orbit of the President's responsibility. Yulia Tymoshenko heads the "Batkivshchyna" faction, whose votes have repeatedly saved government votes in the Verkhovna Rada. The Border Service is an area of direct presidential control. For the US administration, this is enough to report: the pressure worked, Zelensky must become more agreeable.

At the same time, these cases no longer affect the president's entourage — figures of the level of Tatarov, Arahamia, Stefanchuk, Umerov. The President confidently acts in foreign policy again, and negotiations turn into a process without a finish: agreed "90%" and eternal "another 10%."

This model of relations is beneficial to almost everyone. The USA gains leverage without formal interference in Ukraine's internal politics. NABU retains the status of an "untouchable" and popular institution and stable funding. The authorities receive predictability and the ability to negotiate without uncoordinated public scandals.

As a result, the anti-corruption system exists but operates not as a court of conscience, but as an element of a large negotiation architecture. Corruption becomes a language of signals, not a subject of eradication. The irony is that a state fighting for sovereignty increasingly agrees to external governance of its justice, calling it partnership and reforms.

The only question is how much longer society is willing to accept such a construction as an inevitable price of war, rather than a strategic trap for the future development of the state and citizens' trust in the very idea of justice. Without this trust, any victories risk remaining purely military, not transforming into the political renewal of the country.

Hence the logical question: does this mean that Zelensky has taken NABU under soft but effective political control? More and more participants in the state system understand: the war has become a convenient form of governance, and the transfer of power in a once democratic state is postponed to an indefinite "after victory." The political class adapts to the model of a "lifetime ruler."

Or is this just a hypothesis, and NABU is still preparing real strikes on the top of power? If so, what will be the price for the country in wartime? Because anti-corruption as a geopolitical whip can be effective. But without real cleansing, it risks turning into an instrument of stability without a future.