For several weeks in a row, the main political topic in Ukraine and beyond has been the peace plan proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump. Discussions are ongoing not only in the United States and Ukraine but also in European capitals and even in Moscow, which was visited by American representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

This week also begins with negotiations. Volodymyr Zelensky, along with European leaders, is meeting with American negotiators. The plan, which has already been coordinated by Ukrainian and American delegations in Geneva and Florida, will be discussed. At the same time, Kyiv has prepared its own version, which may be proposed for consideration.

The main difference in the Ukrainian approach is the desire to maintain control over all territories currently held by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This includes, in particular, part of the Donetsk region, which Vladimir Putin seeks to fully capture.

Kyiv also insists on its right to join NATO and is seeking a security guarantee formula that would entail not only symbolic support but real participation of allies in the event of new aggression from Russia.

The question is not so much why Americans might support the Ukrainian vision, but why Russians would agree to any of the proposed plans at all. After all, the Kremlin has already stated that a significant part of the points of even Trump's plan is unacceptable to them.

So far, it seems that Putin's goal is to buy time, continuing the war and avoiding serious pressure from the West.

At the same time, it cannot be said that he is fully succeeding. Despite peaceful rhetoric, Donald Trump has imposed new sanctions against Russian oil companies. Additionally, there are signals of U.S. support for Ukrainian strikes on tankers of the so-called "shadow fleet."

Europeans recently agreed to indefinitely block Russian assets, paving the way for a reparations loan for Ukraine. Now, unanimous voting, which Hungary could previously block, is no longer required for this.

On the front, the situation is also far from ideal for Putin. Ukrainian troops have surrounded the occupiers in Kupiansk, although the Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Putin about the "capture" of this Ukrainian city just a few weeks ago.

However, let's imagine that the U.S. convinces Ukraine to cede part of its territories. How could this be legally formalized?

The Constitution of Ukraine does not allow changes to the territorial structure. Even holding a referendum does not guarantee support for such decisions by the majority of citizens. International law, in turn, does not recognize changes in borders as a result of aggression or annexation — precisely what Ukraine has been experiencing in recent years.

A separate issue is security guarantees. Are the U.S. ready to actually enter into conflict with Russia in the event of new aggression? Today, there is no certainty even in NATO's readiness to act according to Article 5 in the event of an attack on a European country. And what about Ukraine? Will such support be legally secured — in the form of a ratified document?

In reality, the only reliable guarantee is Ukraine itself.

A strong, well-armed state with a developed military-industrial complex and its own missiles. Ukraine, an attack on which would inflict such painful losses on Russia that it would deter further aggression. But such a state can only emerge with the support of allies — and only when it is not forced to disarm, as is desired in Moscow.

But if the idea of "demilitarization" of Ukraine is abandoned, how realistic is it that Putin would agree to a peace agreement?

Perhaps the only realistic scenario is the exhaustion of the Russian state. Such a development, where Putin's regime can no longer issue ultimatums to either Ukraine or the West. And only then will there be an opportunity for genuine negotiations.

Until then, the peace process remains a kind of spinning top, rotating but not moving forward.