On December 5, the White House published the doctrine "U.S. National Security Strategy," which declares the goal: to make the U.S. "the greatest, most prosperous, and successful nation." Will it achieve this goal?

A Nation Strained by the Role of Global Policeman
The doctrine begins with the assertion that American "elites" have burdened the U.S. with an excessive role in maintaining world order.
"After the end of the Cold War, American foreign policy elites convinced themselves that perpetual American dominance worldwide was in our country's best interest. However, the affairs of other countries concern us only when their activities directly threaten our interests. Our elites seriously erred in assuming America's readiness to eternally bear the global burden, which the American people saw as unrelated to national interests. They overestimated America's ability to simultaneously fund a vast welfare state based on a regulatory-administrative system, alongside massive military, diplomatic, intelligence, and international aid complexes. They made extraordinarily mistaken and destructive bets on globalism and so-called 'free trade,' which devastated the very middle-class and industrial base upon which American economic and military superiority depends. They allowed allies and partners to shift the costs of their defense onto the American people, sometimes dragging us into conflicts and disputes central to their interests but peripheral to our own. They tied American policy to a network of international institutions, some of which are openly anti-American, and many of which are transnational, aiming to destroy the sovereignty of individual states. Thus, our elites not only pursued a fundamentally undesirable and impossible goal but also undermined the very means necessary to achieve this goal: the character of our nation, upon which its strength, wealth, and dignity were built." 
When these statements are related to American policy over at least the past 30 years, it is evident that they almost entirely reflect the real state of affairs and the actual problems the U.S. faces today. Of course, there have been failures, including attempts to reform Afghanistan and Iraq in a direction more favorable to regional stability and U.S. interests in the region. On the contrary, the current political regimes in both countries are more anti-American than they were before the U.S. initiated military actions there, which resulted in the occupation of both countries without a clear strategic purpose for being there and without a visible honorable conclusion; thus, a disordered withdrawal, bordering on flight, left a power vacuum in these countries, quickly filled by local radical forces linked to Iran, whose regime is an implacable enemy of the U.S.

It is also striking that the vital interests of the U.S. in its "backyard" — Central and South America — have clearly been pushed to the sidelines. It can be logically assumed (whether this is actually the case needs to be researched) that the weakening attention to this region is at least partly caused by interests that the U.S. considered primary at least since the end of World War II — Europe and (since the 1960s) the Middle East. The greatest concentration of efforts (military, economic, diplomatic) on Europe and the Middle East could have led to some waning interest in the Western Hemisphere. However, this distribution of forces was not due to the mistakes of the "elites," but entirely real needs that arose after the victory of the anti-Hitler forces: to ensure peace in Europe by building sovereign, economically successful states linked to the U.S. by the NATO Treaty. After the start of the Cold War (again against a very real threat), such an alliance became of primary importance for the U.S. itself, which became its guarantor and gained a reputation as a reliable ally. In contrast to the failures of the 2000s and 2010s, U.S. policy in Europe is rather a success story. U.S. Middle Eastern policy in the second half of the 20th century was also mostly successful: ensuring a reliable alliance with Israel guaranteed its victory over the Arab countries supported by the USSR and laid the groundwork for peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. 
Successes in Europe and the Middle East in the second half of the 20th century established the leading role of the U.S. as a reliable guardian of the principles that ensured stable peace in Europe and its economic success, which, in turn, ensured the peaceful and stable development of the U.S. itself. 
At the same time, however, the U.S. failed in Vietnam and effectively surrendered this country to world communism — the USSR and China. 
The U.S. successfully helped dismantle the USSR as the cornerstone of world communism but failed in its attempt to integrate post-Soviet Russia into the system of democratic states because Russia's ruling circles rejected the very idea of building a democratic order in this country.

From the entire set of political processes in the second half of the 20th — first quarter of the 21st century, in which the U.S. participated (to varying degrees of involvement), a fairly clear boundary of what is possible for the U.S. emerges: they can cooperate with other states to ensure stability, peace, and the development of economic relations, but they are incapable of restructuring other states in their own image, especially on non-European continents. Hence, one of the fundamental principles of this doctrine emerges: the U.S. can no longer be the "world policeman." This is an objective reality.

Therefore, the task of the doctrine is to redistribute the burden of maintaining world order and international trade between the U.S. and other states, primarily allies, but also those states that are not officially part of alliances with the U.S. Naturally, the U.S. should primarily ensure its own interests — national security, trade, and influence on regional and global processes.

But does this doctrine contribute to achieving the declared goals and tasks?
First and Foremost — Our Own Backyard

"We want to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains stable enough and well-governed enough to prevent and deter mass migration to the United States; we want a hemisphere whose governments will cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations; we want a hemisphere that remains free from hostile foreign invasion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains; and we want to ensure our continued access to key strategic locations."

To achieve these goals, the strategy proposes "engagement and expansion." These concepts mean displacing "players from the non-Western Hemisphere," namely Russia and China, and replacing them with our own influence aimed at ensuring our own interests.

"We will engage long-time friends in the hemisphere to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen stability and security on land and sea. We will expand by cultivating and strengthening new partners while enhancing the attractiveness of our own country as an economic and security partner in the Hemisphere. American policy should focus on engaging regional leaders who can help create acceptable stability in the region, even beyond the borders of these partners. These countries would help us stop illegal and destabilizing migration, neutralize cartels, [develop] coastal manufacturing, and develop the local private economy, among other things. We will reward and encourage governments, political parties, and movements in the region that generally align with our principles and strategy. But we must not neglect governments with other views with whom we nonetheless share interests and who want to cooperate with us."

This is a declaration of open political interference in the affairs of sovereign countries — neighbors of the U.S., which contradicts the principle of "non-interference" proclaimed in the same doctrine. When this doctrine is compared with real policy in the region, particularly regarding Venezuela, it can be concluded that the White House is indeed preparing to push the country towards overthrowing the regime of Nicolás Maduro. This regime is leftist-dictatorial, recently Maduro concluded a "strategic alliance" with Russia, is also intensively cooperating with China, and is illegitimate since the most recent elections are considered by many experts both inside and outside to be grossly rigged in his favor. Brutal repression against all dissenters is one of the powerful sources of mass immigration to the U.S. Therefore, all the prerequisites for U.S. intervention, as noted in the doctrine, are present in Venezuela. Whether Trump will dare to undertake operations that could lead to Maduro's overthrow is still an open question, but judging by the massive military preparations, such a decision is at least being considered now. Will such an operation lead to success in favor of the U.S.? There are great doubts. Trump is undermining democratic foundations in his own country, so how can he bring democratic principles to a foreign country that is largely anti-American? And how will Trump react to a new government in the country if the people elect someone other than who the White House would like? Will the consequences of American intervention be as disastrous for the U.S. as attempts to build democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan?

According to the doctrine, the U.S. will direct a significant, if not the largest, portion of its military, intelligence, and economic resources to the Western Hemisphere — at the expense of reducing attention to Europe and, to some extent, the Middle East.

An important part of the policy in this region is building partnerships for the joint development of strategically important natural resources. "The Western Hemisphere is home to many strategic resources that America must develop in partnership with regional allies to make neighboring countries, as well as our own, more successful. The National Security Council will immediately initiate a robust interagency process to task agencies, supported by the analytical unit of our intelligence community, to identify strategic points and resources in the Western Hemisphere for their protection and joint development with regional partners."

Balancing Trade Imbalances, Primarily with China

Regarding China, the strategy is defined as economic competition and preventing military conflicts.

"Trade with China must be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors. (…) It is important that this is accompanied by strong and sustained attention to deterrence to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific region. Such a combined approach can become a virtuous cycle, as strong American deterrence opens up space for more disciplined economic actions, while more disciplined economic actions lead to increased American resources to support deterrence in the long term," the doctrine states.

Whether the White House will succeed in balancing trade with China is a rather complex question. During the first year, Trump attempted several times to impose tariffs on Chinese goods; Beijing responded with its own tariffs, leading to sharp declines in American stock market indicators and a rapid rise in consumer goods prices, against which American consumers began to protest. The overly complex interdependence in the trade of the two superpowers restrains them both from radical steps.

The doctrine proposes somewhat redistributing trade between the U.S. and China among U.S. allies. "We must encourage Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and other leading countries to implement trade policies that will help rebalance China's economy towards household consumption, as Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East cannot independently absorb China's massive excess capacity. Exporting countries in Europe and Asia can also consider middle-income countries as a limited but growing market for their exports," the document states. Whether this will succeed — there is no answer yet.

Regarding Taiwan: "we will maintain the status quo," but not unilaterally, but in partnership with other countries in the region. Taiwan's importance to the U.S. is due to its "dominance in semiconductor manufacturing" and its geostrategic significance.

Europe: "Become What I Want You to Be"?

The policy towards Europe in the doctrine is outlined in general principles without specific actions (unlike the Western Hemisphere and China). The doctrine is based on the notion that Europe is undergoing "civilizational erasure," meaning it is losing its identity and "self-confidence" due to, according to the document's authors, excessive "transnational regulation." That is, the European Union hinders the free development of the continent's countries, "stifles freedom of speech and expression of political opinion," over-regulates the economy, resulting in a drop in gross domestic product "from 25% of the world to 14%."

The document does not specify what exactly is meant, and what exactly the White House wants Europe to be. Only general outlines: "We want Europe to remain European, regain its civilizational self-confidence, and abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation." It reminds me of an old song: "If I imagined you — become what I want you to be!"

The greatest success of American foreign policy since the second half of the 20th century — a peaceful, united, and successful Europe — is characterized as a failure that exploits poor, unfortunate America.

At the same time, "Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States. Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the world economy and America's prosperity. European sectors — from manufacturing to technology and energy — remain among the most powerful in the world. Europe is home to advanced scientific research and leading global cultural institutions. We not only cannot afford to write off Europe — it would be self-defeating for what this strategy seeks to achieve."

However, Europe must, according to the authors, change, and the U.S. must help it. 
"American diplomacy must continue to advocate for true democracy, freedom of speech, and the unconditional celebration of the individual character and history of European nations. America encourages its political allies in Europe to promote this revival of spirit, and the growing influence of patriotic European parties indeed gives reason for great optimism.

Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a strong Europe to help us successfully compete and work jointly with us to prevent any adversary from dominating Europe."

What is meant by "true democracy"? What are these "patriotic" parties — and there are, it turns out, "unpatriotic" ones?

Again — general phrases. This suggests that there is currently no clear European strategy in the White House. One can only guess what is meant — from Vice President Pence's speech at the Munich Security Conference back in February, in which he emphasized that Europe does not give enough freedom to those parties that bring it closer to Trump, i.e., right-wing radical ones. But Europe, unlike Trump's America, has not forgotten the lessons of World War II and the Cold War and has well learned the threat posed by both right and left radicals and Putin's Russia.

Similarly, relations between Europe and Russia are vaguely stated. "This lack of self-confidence is most evident in Europe's relations with Russia. European allies have a significant advantage over Russia in hard power by almost all measures, except for nuclear weapons. As a result of Russia's war in Ukraine, European relations with Russia are now deeply weakened, and many Europeans view Russia as an existential threat.

Managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic involvement — both to restore conditions of strategic stability across the entire Eurasian continent and to reduce the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.

Such "management," currently demonstrated by Trump and his envoys, only encourages the Russian dictator to continue the war and escalate with Europe. Meanwhile, the leaders of European states are making desperate efforts to limit Trump's "reformist aspirations" regarding the continent and to explain to him the dangers of flirting with the dictator and diluting the clear principles on which the European Union is built.

Ukraine is mentioned only briefly — to assure that Trump will not abandon it.

"It is in the fundamental interests of the United States to negotiate a quick cessation of hostilities in Ukraine to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, restore strategic stability with Russia, and ensure the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine to secure its survival as a viable state." What is meant by "strategic stability with Russia" is again not clarified. Is Russia no longer an adversary? Or is it still?

Only one point is clearly and specifically outlined: "Ending the perception and prevention of NATO as a constantly expanding alliance." Is this to appease Putin? Or does it mean no country is allowed now?

Overall

The U.S. doctrine gives the impression that under the 47th president, America is not only abandoning the role of "global policeman" (which is partially justified). America is refusing to stand guard over democratic values in the most important region — Europe (it is unknown whether it will protect them in other regions, including the Western Hemisphere — likely not). In the face of Russia, which is becoming increasingly brazen due to impunity, this means exposing the main outpost of Western civilization at the moment of its greatest danger.

Historical lessons show: as soon as America withdrew from Europe, wars began there: the First and Second World Wars. If Trump, alongside Putin, succeeds in destroying the European Union in its current form, there is a danger that a new division of the continent will begin.

There remains one single chance: a victory for the Democrats in the 2026 midterm elections in at least one chamber of Congress. Then, at least, Trump's most radical steps will face a system of checks and balances.