November has become a convergence of two major risks for Ukraine — internal and external, corruption and international negotiations. There are suspicions that these two matters coincided in time not by chance. On one hand, there was the official release of at least part of the investigation materials in the so-called "Mindich tapes" case, which exposed a wide network of corrupt influence in the energy sector and caused a strong informational and political resonance. On the other hand, the sudden revival of the negotiation track with the United States and the emergence of mysterious plans with "28 points," and later with "19 points," signaled that the new Trump administration began actively seeking ways for de-escalation. It seems that this de-escalation is largely viewed by American partners through concessions from the Ukrainian side. It appears that the corruption scandal within the Ukrainian government is being used as a means of pressure on the weakened Ukrainian government from the outside.

1. Background: how shadow networks operated in the energy sector

The energy sector in Ukraine has traditionally been one of the most vulnerable to corruption: large sums, complex technical deals, the need for urgent repairs and supplies create a wide field for abuses. Networks operating in this sector link private businesses, intermediaries, and part of the management of state enterprises.
In recent years, stable models have emerged: using shell companies for equipment trading, inflating prices in contracts with contractors and suppliers, fictitious expertise, and a system of "kickbacks" — either directly or disguised as "consulting services." These mechanisms were not limited to a single enterprise — they flowed from one company to another, creating a network of interdependent financial flows.

It was in such an environment that the figure of Borys Mindich, an entrepreneur who, according to investigations, organized and coordinated a number of such mechanisms, operated. Before this high-profile scandal, his name meant little to the average Ukrainian. He did not hold prominent state positions, but in the conditions of an authoritarian state, his role was much more significant — and this role was called "friend of the President." After all, Mindich owned 50% of the most important structure of Volodymyr Zelensky before his presidency — "Kvartal 95 Studio," it was in Mindich's private car that then-presidential candidate Zelensky traveled, and it was in Mindich's apartment that President Zelensky celebrated his birthday. This alone can explain why state officials, including ministers, were forced to listen to an obscure businessman.

2. Factuality: what exactly did NABU disclose

The difference between this corruption story and many others is that the materials did not "leak" into the open space accidentally. NABU conducted anti-corruption measures that allowed for the recording of conversations, agreements, and operations. Part of this material was handed over to SAP for further procedural actions.

The essence of the informational operation was not only in demonstrating the schemes but also in the specific names of officials that appeared in the recordings — often under pseudonyms. Among the names mentioned in the materials were current government ministers — Herman Halushchenko (Minister of Justice) and Svitlana Hrynchuk (Minister of Energy). These names appear in the context of approvals, personnel decisions, and, according to the investigation, influence on contract procedures in strategic companies. NABU has raised suspicions against a number of officials and managers in "Energoatom" and related structures.

Not all mentioned individuals were immediately brought to criminal responsibility — the investigation continues and requires an evidence base. The mere mention of names in wiretaps has political and reputational consequences, even if the case has not yet reached court.

3. Political reaction within: parliament, factions, government ideas

The publication of NABU materials caused a heated discussion in the remnants of the uncontrolled information space and in politically active circles, including the "Servant of the People" faction in the Verkhovna Rada.

Some deputies ("Servant of the People") — notably Mykyta Poturaiev and Maryana Bezuhla — made public demarches. Rumors spread that one of the influential and previously absolutely loyal party leaders — Davyd Arakhamia — was behind the front.

The quasi-opposition ("European Solidarity," "Fatherland") tried to seize the moment to reformat the Government. After the release of the "Mindich tapes," the idea of a "Government of National Unity" was again promoted, which involved introducing representatives of these parties into the Cabinet of Ministers. Yet even in such conditions, the quasi-opposition did not dare to propose the idea of re-elections — essentially only seeking access to management decisions and financial flows.

4. The role of the President's Office and “cleaning up” risks

The attempt to subordinate NABU and SAP began even before the disclosure of the "Mindich tapes," when only information about the existence of compromising material reached the authorities. The President's Office assured that it was about "possible harmonization" of the work of anti-corruption bodies aimed at increasing efficiency. However, in political and public circles, this was interpreted as an attempt to limit the independence of the investigation.

International partners expressed concern. Moreover, in closed consultations, they made it clear that any steps that would question the independence of NABU or SAP would have serious political consequences — from reducing political support to withholding financial assistance.

Civic organizations cooperating with Western funds and embassies became the driving force behind "cardboard protests." The President's Office was forced to revise the bill that mutilated the independence of NABU and SAP.

5. Information wave: impact on society

The absence of mass street demonstrations does not mean the absence of public resonance. Information platforms, social networks, and "word of mouth" made the "Mindich tapes" a central topic.

The discussion unfolded around two poles:

1. Anti-corruption stance

Supporters of transparent investigations demanded full openness, an audit of "Energoatom" contracts, and bringing the guilty to justice. Corruption during the war in the energy sector was rightly called looting. The theme of political responsibility intensified: criticism of the authorities grew, but it was mostly directed at the head of the President's Office.

2. Political-procedural stance

Another part of the audience, including part of the political establishment, spoke about the risks of politicizing NABU and SAP and the possible use of materials in internal political struggle. Some pro-government media tried to promote the thesis that Russia might be behind NABU's actions. This created tension: the public demand for cleansing increased, but trust in institutions fell.

6. Diplomatic background: US activation

Simultaneously, events unfolded in foreign policy, which were somewhat related to internal turbulence and eventually overshadowed the corruption scandal in terms of significance.

Initially, Rustem Umerov, Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, who was rumored to be connected with the figures in the "Mindich tapes," "disappeared" from the media space. Soon, President Zelensky himself headed to Istanbul. The Ukrainian authorities began publicly speaking about readiness for a negotiation process. Due to information leaks, 28 points of the so-called "Trump plan" emerged — a document that many in Ukraine perceived as unacceptable.

In Geneva, the Ukrainian delegation held "constructive negotiations." European partners were involved in correcting the document. Thus, from 28 points, 19 remained. Leaks suggest possible Russian influence on the formation of the initial versions of the document.

Despite this, the negotiation process did not yield real results. It seems that the Trump team primarily seeks a compromise "peace," while neither Zelensky nor Putin is ready for concessions and wants victory, just not openly stating it.

The corruption scandal has made the Ukrainian government more vulnerable to external pressure, but this does not mean that negotiations will yield results. They may last for months or even years — just like the war itself.

While discussions about "war and peace" continue, Ukrainian society risks forgetting about the corruption scandal. And this means only one thing: new Mindiches may emerge — just with different names.