
Oles Doniy ‒ Ukrainian journalist, TV presenter, politician, public and cultural figure
Donald Trump’s voters should be satisfied with the first statements and actions of their elected representative as the second president-elect. Hyperbolized statements, harsh tone, self-confidence, geopolitical economic pragmatism bordering on cynicism ‒ this is what voters loved and voted for him for. Even if the ambitions to annex Canada or Danish Greenland look completely unrealistic during his presidency, even the voicing of such imperial plans is already affecting the anti-liberal nationalist electorate, which has largely become the core of Trumpism. The launched “tariff war” against the allies is no longer a statement, but a fully official decision, which, again, meets electoral expectations. After all, in contrast to the “globalist” concept, Trump is a vivid example of “isolationism,” which does not involve sentiment even for close allies. If “globalism” was aimed at promoting “American values” around the world, and, accordingly, significant costs for those outside the United States, “isolationism” implies a different scheme: minimizing costs to the outside, maximizing the enrichment of both the state as a whole and its components: business structures, citizens, etc. This is how Trump views the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is far from being a priority for him: not to support related ideological values, but to reduce costs. Money, not ideas. This was the reason for his statements while still a presidential candidate about his readiness to stop the war in 24 hours. Reality corrects these bravura statements about the time dimension, but Trump is sticking to the direction of trying to stop the war. His voters should like this approach. After all, this is a demonstration of an attempt to fulfill election promises.
Facts are stubborn things, and these facts show that the negotiations that have begun between the United States, Ukraine, and the aggressor country, Russia, were initiated by the United States, not by the states involved in the war. Neither Ukraine nor Russia showed any active interest in this issue. Ukraine is a victim country, and logically sees justice only in the return of all Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia, compensation for all the damage caused by Russia, and guarantees of non-repetition of similar aggression by Russia. The Kremlin is not going to do any of the above. Moreover, the fulfillment of all these conditions looks like a very distant prospect. So what then is Ukraine’s interest in the negotiation process? Russia also shows no great desire to end the war. Their army is advancing, albeit with heavy losses and minimal progress. For Vladimir Putin personally, the war feeds him, adds to his weight both inside and outside the country. Ukraine has not been broken, Ukrainians will not accept the postulates of the “Russian world,” so why does Russia need a negotiation process? It seems that the United States, or rather the new presidential administration, wants to “freeze” the war and “reconcile” the most. In fact, there is a “compulsion to negotiate,” at least in relation to Ukraine.
The non-diplomatic spat in the Oval Office on February 28 was interpreted by Ukrainians as initiated by US Vice President J.D. Vance. However, there are reasonable assumptions that the Ukrainian side was deliberately preparing to disrupt the negotiations. At the very least, it could have been foreseen in advance that the presence of Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United States Oksana Markarova in the room could be a dangerous trigger. On September 23, 2024, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky visited the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Pennsylvania, where the 155-caliber shells we need so much are manufactured. This seemingly absolutely necessary visit turned into an unprecedented scandal. A number of senators and congressmen, including Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, publicly demanded that Ambassador Markarova be recalled from her post. The thing was that only representatives of the Democratic Party establishment, including Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, took part in this visit from the American side. There was not a single representative of the Republican Party, which, in the midst of the election race, looked not like a state visit but a campaign visit, and in one of the “swing states.” So the Republicans did not miss the opportunity to make a whole PR campaign about it. The party won the presidential election, and its leading figures demanded the recall of the Ukrainian ambassador. One can assume that the Ukrainian government is short-staffed and cannot quickly carry out such a rotation. One might assume that pride and self-confidence did not allow the Ukrainian authorities to heed this demand. But they could not have been unaware of the dissatisfaction and categorical rejection of Markorova in the new presidential administration. And even though the country’s ambassador should have been present according to protocol, there is a concept in diplomacy called “diplomatic illness” for a reason. So if the Ukrainian side had been really interested in a successful negotiation process (and at that stage it was about signing an agreement on rare earth metals), Markarova would have “fallen ill” and not been an irritant. Instead, the quarrel began from the moment Vance began to recall that unsuccessful trip to the Pennsylvania plant. Although he did not mention Markarova’s name, he recounted the details of the scandalous visit, which ultimately gave Zelensky a reason to show emotion, interrupt the US President, and ultimately disrupt the negotiation process at that stage.
By the way, Markarova continues to serve as a “trigger.” Under pressure from his European allies, Volodymyr Zelenskyy soon posted a message on social media that could be interpreted as an actual apology: “My team and I are ready to work under the strong leadership of President Trump for a lasting peace.” In Congress, Donald Trump announced that he had received a letter from the President of Ukraine and quoted it. Instead, Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States emphasized that it was not a letter at all, and Trump only read out a post from social media, effectively correcting or even denying the words of the president of the country in which she holds a diplomatic post. It is good that the US administration did not stir up a new conflict this time, although the pretext was thrown up inadvertently.
It can be assumed that the Ukrainian government may try to use this tactic again. It is not known what arguments the US administration is using to get the Ukrainian side to the negotiating table in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Whether it is threats to stop all financial and military support or some kind of compromising material on the current government, the fact is that the official Ukrainian delegation is sitting down at the negotiating table. The trouble is that any “reconciliation” or “freeze” offered by the American side is essentially an honorable surrender of Ukraine, i.e., acceptance of the status quo, which means that our occupied lands will continue to remain under the heel of the aggressor. The negotiations that ended on March 25, although they contain an agreement to mutually refrain from destroying energy infrastructure (which is more our vulnerability), otherwise contribute to the process of starting to lift economic sanctions against Russia, starting with agricultural products, and even against one of the Russian banks.
One of the members of the Ukrainian parliament made public the content of the agreement on the establishment of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, which can be interpreted in the spirit of neocolonialism. After all, Ukraine is obliged to contribute 50% of its mineral production to the fund, and the US contribution is considered to be made at the expense of the funds provided to Ukraine during the war. The deputy who made the agreement public is not formally a member of the ruling Servant of the People party, and it can be assumed that the “leak” was deliberately made by the Ukrainian authorities to either slow down the process again or try to influence its correction. In conclusion, the negotiations have a chance to last for a very long time, and there is little in the way of state interests in the outcome of the negotiations. In addition, the Ukrainian government is extremely reluctant to hold elections, and the issue of elections will arise if it comes to stopping the shelling, at least of major cities. So in this case, strangely enough, the private and mercantile interests of the Ukrainian authorities coincided with the state interests, according to which no concessions can be made to the enemy. Therefore, the negotiation process looks like it will be a long one. Despite the “compulsion to negotiate”.
To make our position in the negotiations stronger, our task remains the same: we need to become stronger: armed, economically, and socially. To be less dependent on our allies.