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A time of negotiations and bombing

Vitaliy Portnykov ‒ leading Ukrainian political commentator, writer, and journalist

Practically the entire month of March was spent trying to revive the negotiation process and find opportunities for a ceasefire in Ukraine. What is the result? I am writing this text after the next air alert has been canceled and against the backdrop of information about massive strikes on Kharkiv and fires in this large Ukrainian city. Before that, there were massive strikes and fires in Kropyvnytskyi, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Odesa… So, frankly, there is no real ceasefire or truce to speak of.

Well, in international politics, there are often situations when public statements and diplomatic initiatives serve only as a cover for deeper strategic intentions. The recent events related to the Trump-Zelensky conflict in the Oval Office and several rounds of talks in Saudi Arabia are a vivid example of such a smokescreen that hides US President Donald Trump’s lack of effective tools to put pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin or his unwillingness to use the available levers of influence.

After the talks between the American and Ukrainian delegations in Jeddah and the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, Russian Presidential Aide for Foreign Policy Yuri Ushakov held consultations with his American counterpart Mike Volz. Ushakov emphasized that Russia was not interested in a temporary ceasefire, stressing the desire for a long-term peaceful settlement that would take into account Russia’s “legitimate” interests and “concerns.” He characterized the proposal for a temporary ceasefire agreed upon between the American and Ukrainian delegations as only providing a temporary respite for the Ukrainian military.

These statements indicate that the Kremlin sees no point in short-term measures and insists on resolving the conflict on its own terms. Putin likely discussed these terms with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko during his visit to Moscow, which coincided with the arrival of US Special Representative Steve Witkoff in the Russian capital.

Putin’s behavior demonstrates his belief that Trump is in a weak position because of his promises to end the Russian-Ukrainian war quickly, but has no real ability to do so without accepting Russia’s conditions for a cessation of hostilities and the future of Ukraine. Vitkoff, whom Ushakov also characterized as a person who is not an intermediary in Russian-American relations, is interesting to Putin and his entourage only in terms of financial offers they would like to make to the American president through a person close to Trump.

Putin may believe that he can corrupt Trump and his inner circle by convincing them of the need to abandon support for Ukraine and accept that Russia can act at its own discretion in the post-Soviet space. To reinforce this position, Steve Witkoff may be offered serious financial ideas that, in Putin’s opinion, should convince the American leadership of the benefits of abandoning further support for Ukraine. Of course, no one said that such attempts by Putin will really achieve their goal, but they may help the Russian ruler in dragging out negotiations. And Trump himself recently openly stated that Putin is stalling for time.

Yuri Ushakov clearly stated to the US President’s national security assistant that Russia is not interested in a temporary truce on the Russian-Ukrainian front. But not because Russia is interested in peace, as we understand it. Putin’s goal is to destroy Ukrainian statehood. This emphasizes the Kremlin’s tough stance and its unwillingness to make compromises that do not meet its strategic interests. But negotiations are welcome! Putin simply seeks to conduct these negotiations in the context of ongoing hostilities. This significantly differs from Trump’s approach, who would like to first agree on a ceasefire and only then begin a lengthy negotiation process. However, Putin has twice refused Trump a ceasefire, and negotiations between the Russian and American delegations have not brought us closer to it.

Sanctions tools in US-Russian relations, as the last three years have shown, are also not effective enough to ensure a rapid collapse of the Russian economy and the Kremlin’s willingness to agree to a temporary truce or cessation of hostilities. Sanctions can work, but this requires a longer and more serious period of work with the Kremlin, time that Donald Trump, who would like to achieve a ceasefire quickly, does not have.

The most interesting thing after all these negotiations will be whether Trump will recognize the fact that Putin does not need a truce, which will not ensure the fulfillment of his main goal ‒ the destruction of the Ukrainian state and the occupation of its territory.

Given the above, it becomes obvious that without real levers of influence and readiness for tough actions, diplomatic efforts may remain fruitless. The international community must be aware of the Kremlin’s true intentions and be ready to take adequate measures in response to Russia’s aggressive policy.

In this context, it is important for the United States to realize the need to increase sanctions and military pressure on Russia. Any attempts to negotiate with the Kremlin without real mechanisms of influence only give Putin additional time to implement his strategic plans.

We should not forget about the position of Ukraine’s and the United States’ European partners. Key European Union countries, such as Germany and France, have been more cautious than the Americans throughout the war, but recent events have shown a gradual shift in rhetoric to a tougher one. This is due, in part, to the realization that any concession to Putin only encourages him to further aggressive actions and fear that European countries could become victims of such actions. It is not without reason that the German Bundestag in the last weeks before the start of the new government of Friedrich Merz created the conditions for increasing the country’s military budget, and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, proposed an ambitious plan for rearmament of Europe for as much as 800 billion euros.

France, which in the initial stages tried to play the role of a mediator between Ukraine and Russia, is now taking initiatives to increase military assistance to Kyiv, which is evidence of a change in approaches. Paris is now even taking the initiative to possibly deploy its own nuclear weapons in other European countries ‒ which, undoubtedly, can change the very architecture of European security and “play it safe” if the United States of the time of Donald Trump really “leaves” Europe and is no longer interested in the European future.

But the most important thing now is how the American president will behave if his diplomatic efforts do not lead to the desired results. Trump can either change his tactics towards Ukraine, provide Kyiv with more weapons and increase financial assistance, or limit himself to symbolic statements without real action. In this context, the main question is whether Washington, together with its allies, is ready to take decisive action aimed at weakening the aggressor or will continue attempts to reach a compromise with the Kremlin.